A diplomatic snowstorm:
Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte’s
cancelled trip to Vietnam
Original
version in Vietnamese by Tran Binh Nam
Translated
into English by Ton That Dien
According to the
schedule, the Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte would pay a 2-day visit to
Vietnam beginning January 18, 2008 following the regular biannual meeting
between the Chinese and US high-ranking officials in China. Due to China’s
recent claim of the Spratly Islands, many observers regarded his visit to
Vietnam as critical to the situation of the Southeast Asia-Pacific area and the
relations between America, China, and Vietnam.
Without fanfare,
however on 1-18-2006, the US Embassy in Hanoi announced that Negroponte’s
planned visit was cancelled because of ‘snowstorm’
in Guizhou, a southern city of China where Negroponte had meet with his Chinese
counterpart. Nobody believed the announced reason for the cancellation of Mr.
Negroponte trip to Vietnam. In this modern time, and for the second highest
state official of a superpower in the world, such a natural obstacle could be
easily overcome.
There may be three
explanations for the cancellation of the trip:
1) US unilateral
decision. This is hard to believe regarding the current good relationship
between US and Vietnam.
2) Recommendation from China to Negroponte.
This is quite impossible due to the delicate diplomatic protocol (for China)
and the superpower self-esteem (for the US); and
3) Ha Noi requested for
a delay that led to Negroponte’s decision to cancel it altogether. This
probably may be the case. China may advise Vietnam with pressure to delay Negroponte’s visit until after its Deputy Premier
and Minister of Foreign Affairs Pham Gia Khiem’s return from his visit to China
from 22 to 26 of January. If so China has again scored another point against
the US and Vietnam as it did in 2007 when Vietnam's Chief of State Nguyen Minh
Triet had to make a sudden unplanned trip to China prior to his US official
visit.
Another aspect of the
visit of Negroponte would enter into the picture. On January 19, 2008 when the
Vietnamese inside the country as well as overseas commemorating the naval
battle between the Chinese and the Republic of Vietnam Navy 34 years ago, in
which the Chinese defeated Vietnam to take over the Paracel Islands, the
presence of Negroponte in Hanoi as scheduled (January 18 -21, 2008) would raise
a controversial question: Would his visit have anything to do with the US-China
strategy in the Spratleys issue? Henry
Kissinger, former Secretary of State under Nixon recounted vaguely in his book
“Years of Upheaval” that during his
visit to Beijing on November 10, 1973, some kind of unwritten agreement had
been reached for the Chinese to take over the Paracels, in anticipation of
Hanoi reunification of Vietnam. Chinese at that time had good relations with
the US and a staunch enemy against the then Soviet Union, while Hanoi was a
good client of the Soviet Union.
Of course, the
geopolitics of today between the US, China, and Vietnam is quite different
with that of the 1970’s. The game that the US may play is no longer similar to
that in 1974, and the current relationships between US, China and Vietnam suggest
the US would help Vietnam to keep the Spratleys out of China’s hands. That
could be a subject of discussion between Negroponte and Hanoi during his
planned visit.
In the last four years,
the diplomatic wind has changed the direction. Vietnam has inched closer and
closer to the US while exercising caution in its relation with China. Many
high-ranking officials of Vietnam have visited the capitals of the US and
China.
In November 2003
Vietnam’s Secretary of Defense Pham Van Tra visited Washington D.C. followed by
the visits of Premier Phan Van Khai in June 2005, then Premier Nguyen Tan Dung
in January 2007, and Chief of State Nguyen Minh Triet in June 2007.
On the US part, the
modern US Ship Vandergrift docked in Saigon on December 2003, whose sailors in
white uniforms on Saigon streets somehow cleared away the bad memories and hard
feelings of the past bloody war between two countries. Then came US good
gesture to Hanoi late in November 2006 when President George W. Bush visited
Hanoi on his occasion of attending the annual APEC meeting. On this occasion,
President Bush had removed Vietnam from the list of Countries of Particular
Concern (CPC), even Vietnam had made no real progress in its policies toward
religions. After returning from Hanoi, he had helped Vietnam to become a WTO
member.
All these ties mean
that Hanoi leaders have sensed the need to strategically siding with the US to
balance China’s pressure.
The US, however,
remains silent in regards to China’s decision to annex administratively the Paracels and the Spratleys in December 2007; while it
was no doubt that, both archipelagoes are equally important to it as they are
to China. Both islands, beside from being in the proximity to the strategic
seaway between Malacca Straits and Northern Pacific, are lying on a pocket of
significant volumes of natural gas and crude oil, a valuable world resources
for decades to come.
In claiming the two
groups of islands, China seemed to intentionally let Vietnam know of its
dissatisfaction for Hanoi's moving closer to the US, and to simultaneously
caution the US that it was ready to widen its ‘espace vitale’ and accept challenges from the US Navy. As a result,
Admiral Timothy Keaty, Commander of US forces in the Pacific, paid a visit to
Vietnam after the annexation without the media learning much about his mission
there. Chances were the Admiral came to Vietnam because of the question of
Spratlys, as well as the agenda of the Deputy Secretary Negroponte.
Hanoi’s indecision has
probably been an obstruction. All of its top leaders have kept their mouth
shut, except permitting the spokesperson of the Foreign Ministry to state
repeatedly in public that the Spratleys were historically until now part of
Vietnam.
In its side, Chinese
remained cautious, mainly because China has been busy with its preparation for
the 2008 Olympics. The situation might be different in 2009 though, and if the
Chinese resort to force to enforce its annexation of Spratlys it would be too
late for Vietnam to defend the country. Now it could be that Hanoi chose to do
nothing just to avoid to jeopardize its relations with China with unpleasant
consequences. It could also be that Vietnam was trying to guess what the US was
going to act.
In a national crisis,
especially when facing an invasion, it is important for the leaders of Vietnam
to unite to be able to devise ways to defend effectively the country. Signs
have shown, unfortunately, that they have been deeply divided between those
advocating peaceful tactics in dealing with China and those leaning toward
asking for international assistance (namely the US). It is the division that
has been paralyzed the Vietnamese leadership so far.
According to Vietnam's
historical experiences, for long-term national security, it is better to use a
reconciliatory strategy to deal with China. History however, also teaches that
reconciliatory attitude will be successful only after China had been badly
defeated militarily. The current leaders of Vietnam, due to internal indecision
found themselves in a coined situation. They simply did not do what should be
done in this situation. Strongly reaffirm Vietnam's sovereignty over the
islands by the national Congress is one thing. Meanwhile, they must motivate
the whole people to stand up to defend the country through political openness
with adequate freedom of speech. They have nothing to fear the people.
Internationally they must look for allies, including first the US, then India,
Australia, the ASEAN bloc and the European Union. It should also modernize the
armed force, specially the Navy. With right diplomacy, they could do all these
things while still maintaining good relations with China.
China’s 4000-year
history proved that when it is strong and unified, it attempts to expand.
Vietnam was its victim several times in the past, but thanks to the people’s
determination, we succeeded in defeating China in every single case. This time,
after four centuries in obscurity and humiliated by western countries, China is
again on the rise and its ambition of expansion is reborn. From late 1950,
China has designed a plan to dominate Vietnam, bit by bit.
Vietnam now is really
facing a huge danger of losing its entity (like Tibet) if an unforeseen world
event forces the Chinese to occupy Vietnam under the pretext of self-defense. The current communist leaders have no plan to
face this sad eventuality.
A clear proof is the
circumstances around the cancellation of the Deputy Secretary of State
Negroponte to Vietnam on January 18, 2008./.
Tran Binh Nam
January 19, 2008
(In memory of the Paracels battle 34 years ago)
Translated into English by Ton That Dien
Trần Bình Nam
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